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FILLING COLLECTIVE DUTY GAPS* 
In 1979, an Air New Zealand passenger jet crashed into the side of Mount Erebus in 
Antarctica, killing 257 people. The resulting Royal Commission of Inquiry found that the 
aircraft was on an incorrect flight path. It was a “mistake ... directly attributable, not so 
much to the persons who made it, but to the incompetent administrative airline 
procedures which made the mistake possible.”1  
Today, millions of individuals drive, fly, and eat in ways that, individually, make 
a miniscule difference to climate change—if that, given the thresholds involved in 
causing a flight to take off or a cow to be farmed.2 These minuscule bad effects are 
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 Royal Commission, Report of the Royal Commission to Inquire into the Crash on 
Mount Erebus, Antarctica, of a DC10 Aircraft Operated by Air New Zealand Limited 
(Wellington: P.D. Hasselberg Government Printer: 1981), at p. 159.  
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 Shelly Kagan, “Do I Make a Difference?,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, XXXIX, 2 
(Spring 2011): 105–41; Julia Nefsky, “Consequentialism and the Problem of Collective 
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plausibly outweighed by the joy and convenience of driving, flying, and eating on any 
occasion—so, each individual polluting action seems permissible.3 These individual 
actions will combine to harm millions of the world’s current children, who will grow up 
to inherit an Earth that is far more damaged than it would have been had no polluting 
actions had occurred.4 
 These two cases are different in many respects, which will become important later 
(§III and §V). What they have in common is that each gives rise to a ‘collective duty 
gap’: a group caused (or will cause) harm that requires remedying, but no member did 
harm serious enough to impose a remedial duty on them. In other words: intuitively, there 
exists a duty to remedy the group-level harm, but there is a ‘gap’ between this apparent 
                                                                                                                                                 
Harm: A Reply to Kagan,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, XXXIX, 4 (Fall 2011): 364–
95. 
3
 Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “It’s not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral 
Obligations,” in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Richard B. Howarth, eds., Perspectives 
on Climate Change: Science, Economics, Politics, Ethics (Bingley: JAI Press, 2005), pp. 
293-315. 
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 I do not assert that driving, flying, or buying meat makes no difference to how damaged 
the planet is. (On how it makes a difference, see John Broom, Climate Matters (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 2012); Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1984), at pp. 67–86.) Rather, the idea is that the harm of any one such 
action is so small as to be rendered permissible by the cost to the agent of avoiding the 
harm.  
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group-level remedial duty, and a lack of justification for individual-level remedial duties 
for the group members.  
This article addresses the question: how might we fill collective duty gaps? That 
is: how might we justify duties for individuals to help remedy harms caused by groups of 
which they are a member, even when the individuals did no (or utterly negligible) harm 
themselves?5  
§I outlines two initially plausible methods for filling collective duty gaps. Each 
method ultimately asserts that group members are obliged to remedy harms done in part 
by others. §II considers two possible objections to this assertion: the unfairness objection 
and the demandingness objection. Drawing on the ongoing debate over duties to ‘take up 
the slack,’ I argue that these objections are not fatal to gap-filling duties.  
                                                 
5 Collective duty gaps differ from collective responsibility gaps. The latter are gaps in 
backwards-looking blame, control, agency, or causation; the former, gaps in forward-
looking duty or obligation. Collective responsibility gaps are discussed (not always with 
that term) by, amongst others, Frank Jackson, “Group Morality,” in J.C.C. Smart, Philip 
Pettit, Richard Sylvan, and Jean Norman, eds., Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in 
Honour of J.J.C. Smart (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987); David Copp, “The Collective Moral 
Autonomy Thesis,” Journal of Social Philosophy, XXXVIII, 3 (Fall 2007): 369–88; 
Philip Pettit, “Responsibility Incorporated,” Ethics, CXVII, 2 (January 2001): 171–201; 
Matthew Braham and Martin van Hees, “Responsibility Voids,” The Philosophical 
Quarterly, LXI, 242 (January 2011): 6–15. Duty gaps arise out of responsibility gaps, yet 
duty gaps are more morally tractable: as I will argue, we can fill duty gaps with 
something other than individual-level blame, control, agency, or causation over the harm.  
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However, this defence is not enough to fill the gaps, for two reasons. The first 
reason is explained in §III: the idea of ‘taking on costs that should be borne by others’ 
(that is, slack-taking) is a category error in groups that are not agents. Such groups 
include ‘the affluent,’ ‘polluters,’ and ‘the international community’. Many duty gaps 
arise in such non-agent groups. But slack-taking is not a category error in groups that are 
agents, such as states and corporations. Thus, if there are any duties to fill collective duty 
gaps, then they are different in group agents, as compared with non-agent groups. In the 
former, gap-filling duties are individual duties to take on costs that should be borne by 
others (slack-take); in the latter, gap-filling duties are simply demanding individual 
duties. We should see slack-taking reparative duties as a species of the genus of gap-
filling duties. So, the concept of slack-taking cannot do all the work we need.  
 §IV turns to the second, and deeper, problem for gap-filling duties: we need a 
positive justification for the entire genus of these duties. §IV provides such a 
justification. In brief, in both agent and non-agent groups, gap-filling duties are justified 
by the normative force of commitments individuals make to others to positively respond 
to harm-generating ends. §V sketches how commitments can be used to fill the gaps 
found in the Erebus and climate change cases. As we shall see, commitments will not fill 
these two gaps entirely: under my proposal, not all the individuals involved will have 
duties—though many of them will—and the duties that are generated may not aggregate 
to fully remedy the harm—though they will get partway there.6  
                                                 
6
 We could try to get the rest of the way there by pointing to individuals’ capacity to help 
or the fact that they benefited from the harm (Iris Marion Young, Responsibility for 
Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Holly Lawford-Smith, “Benefiting from 
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I. Two Proposals to Fill Gaps 
How might we fill collective duty gaps? I will detail two proposals. Both naturally fit 
gaps within group agents, yet both extend to non-agent groups. To briefly characterise 
this distinction: the hallmark of a group agent is a group-level rational decision-making 
procedure, which uses inputs and methods of decision-making that are distinct from the 
inputs and methods used in the respective decision-making procedures of the group’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
Failures to Address Climate Change,” Journal of Applied Philosophy, XXXI, 4 
(November 2014): 392–404; Robert Huseby, “Should the Beneficiaries Pay?,” Politics, 
Philosophy and Economics, XIV, 2 (May 2015): 209–25). However, such duty bases will 
not reliably pick out only members of the harm-creating group. That is, these bases will 
not reliably pick out Air New Zealand members in the Erebus case, or polluters in the 
climate change case. Instead, these bases are liable to assign duties to outsiders. To 
illustrate, suppose Qantas Airline has far more money than Air New Zealand and 
benefitted greatly from the crash (because the crash caused would-be Air New Zealand 
passengers to switch airlines).  Should we therefore say that Qantas has a remedial duty to 
financially support the crash victims’ families? No. We want a justification for individual 
remedial duties that, by and large, picks out members of the harm-creating group, not 
non-members. To foreshadow: my proposed justification will not pick out all and only 
members of the harm-creating group. But it will much more closely approximate that 
ideal than do capacity or benefit. 
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members.7 The group’s decision-making procedure determines, among other things, who 
these members are. Group agents operate their procedures from, and to maintain, a 
rational point of view: the group updates its beliefs, goals, and so on to maintain 
integration amongst its various beliefs, goals, and so on.8 Non-agent groups lack distinct 
decision-making procedures and rational points of view. In short: airlines are group 
agents; ‘polluters’ is not a group agent.  
 
I.1 First Proposal: Individual Wrongs 
The first proposal—Individual Wrongs—posits that collective duty gaps can be filled 
with duties grounded in individual wrongs. This does not require asserting that 
individuals wrongfully caused the harm, which ex hypothesi they might not have. It just 
requires that they, in some way perhaps non-causally connected to the harm, did wrong.  
There are multiple places at which to locate these individual wrongs. I will 
describe three, using Erebus to illustrate. As will become clear, there is a general 
problem, which is extendable to other possible locations. 
First, perhaps each member reneged on duties regarding their individual inputs 
into the group-level harm. Perhaps some individual inputs were produced with an 
                                                 
7
 Peter French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1984); Christian List and Philip Pettit, Group Agency: The Possibility, 
Design, and Status of Corporate Agents (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
8
 Carol Rovane, Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998). 
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unreasonable lack of thought,9 for example in the design of the airline’s software. Or 
perhaps the members ought to have acted strategically,10 for example by covertly 
supervising their colleagues’ actions. If so, the relevant individuals are blameworthy, and 
we can use this blameworthiness to justify individual duties that fill the gap. However, 
we can imagine that the individual inputs were reasonable given the evidence (and 
gathering alternative evidence would have been impossible or unduly demanding),11 or 
that the airline’s procedures forbade paternalistic treatment of colleagues. If so, a 
different pattern of inputs was not feasible for any given member, so the actual pattern of 
inputs was not wrong, and the duty gap remains. 
There is a second place where we might try to locate the individual wrongs. 
Perhaps the group has “steering members” to whom the group’s duties directly apply, 
such that, for example, the group’s duty to require in-depth pre-input evidence-gathering 
translates into a duty for the steering member(s) to require such evidence-gathering from 
all members, prior to the harm. If so, steering members are straightforwardly on the hook 
for the group’s harm.12 Plainly, there will not always be steering members (regarding 
climate change, the lack of an international authority is notorious). And even if there are 
steering members—as in Air New Zealand’s Board of Directors—we need some way of 
                                                 
9
 Frank Hindriks, “Corporate Responsibility and Judgment Aggregation,” Economics and 
Philosophy, XXV, 2 (July 2009): 161–77.  
10
 Braham and van Hees, “Responsibility Voids,” op. cit., p. 2012. 
11
 Copp, “The Collective Moral Autonomy Thesis,” op. cit., p. 380. 
12
 David J. Zoller, “Distributing Collective Moral Responsibility to Group Members,” 
Journal of Social Philosophy, XLIV, 4 (Winter 2014): 478–97, at p. 490. 
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justifying the costs the steerers will likely impose on non-steering members, when 
fulfilling the group’s remedial duty that, ex hypothesi, arose out of the steerers’ failure. 
Non-steerers may face pay-cuts, or longer hours, or public shame, or tedious re-
organisation of the group. The steering approach will often need to be supplemented with 
an approach that can justify these costs on those lower down the hierarchy. 
Third, one could go “meta”: perhaps individuals are blameworthy not just for 
their individual reasoning about inputs, nor just for being unresponsive to the reasons that 
bear on the group, but for the very fact that group-level harms can create remedial duties 
when individual inputs are excusable. That is, perhaps individuals control for the fact that 
duty gaps are possible within their group.13 If this control is wrongfully exercised, then 
individual wrongdoing justifies duties that fill the gap. However, in group agents at least, 
there are good reasons to think the group itself (not the individual members) controls for 
the fact that collective duty gaps can arise.14 Even if one balks at group-level control, any 
group with a division of powers will be one in which no individual member controls for 
the group’s gap-producing tendencies. Instead, any individual member controls only her 
own individual contributions to that tendency. Maybe she can influence other members to 
some extent, but rarely will this amount to full-blown control.  
                                                 
13
 Pekka Mäkelä, “Collective Agents and Moral Responsibility,” Journal of Social 
Philosophy, XXXVIII, 3 (Fall 2007): 456–68, esp. p. 463. 
14
 Pettit, “Responsibility Incorporated,” op. cit.; Anders Strand, “Group Agency, 
Responsibility, and Control.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, XLIII, 2 (June 2013): 
201–24. 
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In short, these three variations on Individual Wrongs leave us with unfilled gaps 
(even when employed disjunctively—there will be cases when none of these variations 
gets a hold). The general problem is this: individuals do not control the broader context 
within which they act (for example, they do not control the evidence they reason from in 
choosing their inputs, or the existence and cost-bearing capacity of steerers, or the way 
powers are dispersed in the group). If this broader context forces the individual actions 
that contribute to the group harm, those actions do not look like wrongs.15 This was, in 
essence, the finding of the Erebus inquiry. 
Both Individual Wrongs and its limitations extend to non-agent groups. Consider 
anthropogenic climate change. In seeking to apply Individual Wrongs, we might 
investigate the reasons why each individual pollutes, or ask who (if anyone) steers the 
polluting, or ask who allows individual-level polluting to be negligible even while group-
level polluting is significant. If individuals pollute for bad reasons, or if someone steers 
the polluting, or if someone causes the duty gap, then Individual Wrongs holds them 
blameworthy and uses this to justify duties for them, where these duties fill the gap.  
However, as with group agents, there are sometimes no (or not enough) 
individuals who do wrong in non-agent groups, so we cannot fill duty gaps to the brim.16 
                                                 
15
 Felix Pinkert, “What If I Cannot Make a Difference (and Know It),” Ethics, CXXV, 4 
(July 2015): 971–98 tries to locate individual wrongs in counterfactuals about the 
individuals. I cannot fully treat this solution, but it looks unlikely to pick out group 
members in particular, as per fn. 6. 
16
 On the near-impossibility of finding enough wrongful individuals involved in the 
harms of the global apparel industry, see Young, Responsibility for Justice, op. cit.. 
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Many people reasonably believe that their polluting will make negligible difference; no 
one steering agent (or group agent) can be expected to respond to a group-level reason to 
make the global economy non-reliant on fossil fuels (because no one agent can do that); 
and the duty gap is not anyone’s doing. Thus, the limitations of Individual Wrongs extend 
to non-agent groups. 
In light of this, advocates of Individual Wrongs have two options. First, they can 
insist that in cases where we jettison judgments of individual wrongdoing, we also 
jettison judgments of individual remedial duties.17 This leaves duty gaps unfilled. Second, 
they can insist that members have remedial duties justified by something other than (ex 
hypothesi, non-existent) individual wrongs.18 This fills duty gaps by baldly asserting that 
members can be obliged to remedy harms caused by a combination of permissible 
actions, of which each individual’s action was just one. This raises the question of 
whether such duties face objections. I address this question in §II. 
 
I.2 Second Proposal: Joint Wrongs 
A second proposal for filling collective duty gaps relies not on wrongs done by 
individuals severally, but on wrongs individuals do together or jointly. Call this view 
Joint Wrongs. It likewise has variations, including equivalents of those I outlined under 
                                                 
17
 Zoller (“Distributing Collective Moral Responsibility to Group Members,” op. cit.) is 
focused on responsibility, not duties, but I suspect he might take this option. Mäkelä 
(“Collective Agents and Moral Responsibility,” op. cit.) moves to joint wrongdoing, 
discussed in the next sub-section. 
18
 Hindriks, “Collective Responsibility and Judgment Aggregation,” op. cit., at p. 175. 
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Individual Wrongs: perhaps Air New Zealand employees are jointly responsible for bad 
reasoning, or for steerers’ failings, or for the company’s tendency toward duty gaps.19  
 The question for this proposal is how a joint wrong can justify individual remedial 
duties, where the latter fill the gap. This is no less mysterious than our original question 
of how the group’s harm can justify such individual duties. One might think that joint 
wrongs entail joint duties, which conceptually entail individual duties. However, the 
inference from joint duties to individual duties commits an inverse compositional fallacy, 
akin to saying that each of a number of bricks must be 10m tall because the wall they 
constitute is 10m tall. We need justification for such an inference. We also need 
clarification on the very notion of a joint wrong and, subsequently, a joint duty.20 
Here we could draw on Christopher Kutz’s “Complicity Principle.” This 
parsimoniously moves from joint wrong to individual remedial duties, bypassing the 
notion of joint duties: 
 
                                                 
19
 Mäkelä claims members “jointly” control the group’s procedures and structure 
(“Collective Agents and Moral Responsibility,” op. cit., at p. 465). 
20
 Gunnar Björnsson develops the notion of a shared duty (“Essentially Shared 
Obligations,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XXXVIII, 1 (September 2014): 103–20); 
Anne Schwenkenbecher develops the notion of a joint duty (“Joint Duties and Global 
Moral Obligations,” Ratio, XXVI, 3 (2013): 310–28). Neither of these, however, builds 
on the notion of a joint wrong, which is prior in the Joint Wrongs approach. If I am right 
that joint wrongs and joint duties do not generate individual duties, then, even if there is a 
sound notion of a joint or shared duty, this will not help the Joint Wrongs approach. 
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The Complicity Principle: (Basis) I am accountable for what others do when I 
intentionally participate in the wrong they do or the harm they cause. (Object) I 
am accountable for the harm or wrong we do together, independently of the actual 
difference I make.21 
 
Kutz’s primary argument for the Complicity Principle is this: “If a set of agents’ 
participatory intentions overlap, then the will of each is represented in what each other 
does qua group member, as well as what they do together. The logical overlap permits us 
to say they manifest their attitudes through one another’s actions… The coincidence of 
our intentions grounds my accountability for your actions.”22 Participatory intentions 
triple the objects of individual authorship: I author what I do, what you do, and what we 
do; you author what you, what I do, and what we do.23 Thus, the move is from individual 
intentional participation in joint activities, to joint authorship of those activities, to 
individual remedial duties. 
The main problem here is the shift from separate individual intentions to 
authorship for what others do, if we suppose (with Kutz) that authorship implies 
                                                 
21
 Christopher Kutz, Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), at p. 122. 
22
 Kutz, Complicity, op. cit., 140–41. 
23
 Kutz, Complicity, op. cit., 138. A similar conception of joint authorship is used by Avia 
Pasternak to (in my terminology) justify citizens’ duties to fill gaps that result from 
states’ harms (Avia Pasternak, “Limiting States’ Corporate Responsibility,” Journal of 
Political Philosophy, XXI, 4 (December 2013): 361–81). 
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individual remedial duties.24 If each of A, …, N intends to ‘φ together,’ then there are N 
intentions, each held by a different individual. Nothing is implied about any of the 
individuals having any significant relation to any of the others or their intentions, such as 
a relation of control or influence or emulation between the intentions. So authorship for 
what the others do—if this is understood as implying individual remedial duties for what 
the others do—receives insufficient justification. To illustrate: we can imagine two 
people on opposite sides of Earth, each of whom intends to ‘enact a socialist revolution 
together with whoever else intends to enact a socialist revolution.’ If one of them causes 
harm in their attempt to enact revolution, it would be inaccurate to say the other authored 
the harm (in a way that implies a duty to remedy the harm). The same goes for harms 
caused by people within a large group agent, each individually acting on an individual 
intention such as ‘operate flights to Antarctica together.’ A morally loaded conception of 
authorship—that is, a conception that implies individual remedial moral duties—bears a 
high justificatory burden. Perhaps such a burden can be met in small-scale and intimate 
groups (like two people painting a house together), but it cannot be met in the collective 
duty gaps that worry us the most: those that arise in large companies or in aggregations of 
                                                 
24
 The latter supposition is why I discuss Kutz, rather than, say, Michael Bratman, Shared 
Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); 
Margaret Gilbert, On Social Facts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); or 
Raimo Tuomela, The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). These authors have sophisticated accounts of joint 
action/authorship, but none suppose that joint action or authorship implies remedial moral 
duties for individuals. I believe these authors are right to demur on that implication.  
  
14 
 
people spread all over Earth. (§IV’s proposal will rely on commitments, not authorship, 
and will apply across a range of cases.) 
As with Individual Wrongs, Joint Wrongs and its problems extend to non-agent 
groups. Again, consider climate change. Kutz implies that all emitters intend to 
participate in the collective project of “private transportation”,25 and thus are on the hook 
for the harms caused by aggregating each person’s pursuit of this project. Joint Wrongs 
thus purports to apply. There are two problems here. The first is that many gaps in non-
agent groups aren’t the result of any joint activity: to suggest that you and I (who have 
likely never met) intend to have private transportation together is to stretch the notion of 
togetherness to breaking point. The second problem was highlighted above: even if we 
each had the individual intention of doing this together, more would be required to 
generate my normatively-implicating authorship of your emissions (for example, that I 
control your emissions).   
Considering this, if we are to hold that an individual has gap-filling duties, this 
will mean imputing to her duties to remedy effects that the she did not wrongfully author 
(in a morally-implicating sense of authorship). This is just as it was for Individual 
Wrongs. The question arises of whether we can refute objections to these duties. 
II. Objections to Gap-filling Duties 
There is a growing debate about slack-taking duties, that is, duties to take on others’ 
shares of collective burdens when those others fail to comply by taking on their share. 
This debate has arisen around collective duties of beneficence, rather than collective 
                                                 
25
 Kutz, Complicity, op. cit., 188. 
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duties of remedy. Notwithstanding the potential disanalogies between remedial and 
beneficence duties, the debate on slack-taking deserves consideration here. This is 
because two broad objections have been targeted at slack-taking duties, both of which 
(and the replies to them) naturally extend to the gap-filling duties that, we found, had to 
be simply asserted under Individual Wrongs and Joint Wrongs. I will explain how these 
objections extend, and how they can be refuted.  
II.1 Unfair 
This objection is strongest if someone, somewhere, sometime is culpable for the 
collective duty gap, but is unable to fill that gap themselves (for example, because they 
are dead or have shallow pockets). To motivate the objection, return to Erebus. Assume 
the airline’s founders were culpable for the incompetent administrative airline 
procedures. Suppose these founders died long ago, such that they cannot now have a gap-
filling duty. It might look unfair that present-day employees are required to take on costs 
in remedying the founders’ bad decisions. We could perhaps argue that present-day 
members of the Board of Directors consented to such costs when taking up their jobs—
but remedial costs will likely fall on non-Directors as well, which looks unfair. Likewise 
for the pollution case: suppose powerful individuals (leaders of key states and 
international organisations, for example) were culpably inactive when anthropogenic 
climate change first came to light. But these individuals are now off the scene or 
deceased. It might look unfair that their share of the collective duty somehow shifts to 
present day individuals who are (by stipulation) insufficiently blameworthy to justify the 
full cost of the duty. 
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 David Miller gives the following toy case to motivate the unfairness objection: If 
Bert steals Anne’s money and then runs away, it seems bizarre to say that Charles is 
required to compensate Anne. Miller explains: “the injustice that remains, because of 
partial compliance [that is, because past people culpably didn’t do what they ought], is 
the responsibility of the noncompliers, and only theirs.”26 Liam Murphy likewise argues: 
“[t]hat I know that you will not do [or, presumably, have not done] what you are 
supposed to do does not alter the fact that you are responsible for what you are 
responsible for, and I am responsible for what I am responsible for. … [Y]our 
responsibility remains your responsibility, it does not become mine.”27 
 For this objection to block gap-filling duties, it would have to be that upholding 
fairness between actors (for example, between company members or polluters across 
time) is more important than remedying harm done to others (for example, families of 
disaster victims or Earth-inheriting children). Thus Anja Karnein points out that we need 
to distinguish (a) a non-complier’s duty to fellow actors from (b) a fellow actor’s duty to 
third parties.28 These are two different duties, held by two different agents, to two 
different (collections of) agents. What’s the connection between them? To help Miller’s 
                                                 
26
 David, Miller, “Taking Up the Slack? Responsibility and Justice in Situations of Partial 
Compliance,” in Carl Knight and Zofia Stemplowska, (eds), Responsibility and 
Distributive Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 238–39. 
27
 Liam Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), at p. 115. 
28
 Anja Karnein, “Putting Fairness in its Place: Why there is a Duty to Take Up the 
Slack,” The Journal of Philosophy, CXI, 11 (November 2014): 593–607, at p. 594.  
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and Murphy’s cases, let us suppose the airline’s founders unfairly reneged on a duty to 
create sound administrative procedures, where that duty was owed, at least in part, to 
future company members. Likewise, suppose global leaders in the 1980s unfairly reneged 
on an emission-reducing duty, which was owed, at least in part, to present-day polluters 
(because it would make present-day polluters better off, by removing the duty gap 
conundrum). These non-compliers have unfairly reneged on (a) their duty to fellow 
actors. When and why should this intra-group unfairness have any bearing at all on (b) 
what those present-day actors owe third parties?  
 Presumably, the answer will depend on the severity of the intra-group unfairness, 
as against the severity of the harm to third parties, as against the cost of remedying that 
harm. The present-day Air New Zealand members should not have to, say, become 
utterly destitute by compensating the victims’ families. But it does not seem unfair for 
them to forgo a pay rise. If the latter is at issue, then acknowledging the unfairness done 
to present members is not more important than remedying the harm done to the crash 
victims (by compensating their families). Thus, the unfairness objection to gap-filling 
duties does not stick in every case. 
 There is a second, and more generalisable, reply to this unfairness objection. This 
is that imposing costs on present-day individuals does not preclude acknowledging the 
unfairness done to them. This second reply thus also addresses Murphy’s complaint about 
the gap-fillers “taking on” the responsibility of the gap-creators. The gap-creators’ 
reneging on their duty is done and remains, no matter whether the gap is filled or not. The 
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gap-creators retain their moral agency and are fully morally blameworthy for not doing 
their duty.29  
 Thus, drawing on the slack-taking debate, we can see that gap-filling duties (like 
slack-taking duties) are not necessarily objectionably unfair—even if someone is 
blameworthy for the gap’s existence. 
II.2 Demanding 
A second objection to slack-taking duties is that they permit slackers to increase 
morality’s demands on slack-takers. As applied to collective duty gaps, the objection is 
that, if gap-filling duties existed, then by creating poor administrative procedures 
(Erebus), or by polluting (climate change), some individuals could increase morality’s 
demands on others. There is an easy reply: we cannot rule out all duties whose demands 
are created by others’ actions. This would rule out duties to come to others’ aid when 
they have been oppressed, exploited, or placed in dire need by third parties.30 This would 
be to throw much of ordinary morality out the window.  
 This objection points to what may be at the heart of the debate about slack-taking, 
which is a debate about morality’s demandingness. That is, the objection is that slack-
taking increases morality’s demands on slack-takers, such that slack-taking might cause 
                                                 
29
 Simon Caney, “Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Climate Change,” Leiden 
Journal of International Law, 2005, XVIII, 4 (December 2005): 747–75, at p. 772; 
Karnein, “Putting Fairness in its Place,” op. cit., p. 605. 
30
 Zofia Stemplowska, “Doing More than One’s Fair Share,” Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy, XIX, 5 (2015), at p. 594. 
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slack-takers to step over some threshold of demandingness, which morality cannot 
demand agents to cross. Mutatis mutandis for gap-filling and gap-fillers. 
 However, if general over-demandingness is the objection, then again this is not 
unique to slack-taking or gap-filling. Keeping one’s promises or saving drowning 
toddlers is over-demanding in some contexts. But that isn’t an objection to there being 
duties, in other contexts, to keep your promises or save drowning toddlers. Likewise, 
agents do not have slack-taking or gap-filling duties if this would exceed the demands 
that morality can make on the agent for the sake of the value at stake. But the objection 
does not speak against duties to slack-take or gap-fill in other cases. Thus, slack-taking 
and gap-filling obligations are not necessarily objectionably demanding.  
III. Gap-Filling Duties in Agent vs Non-agent Groups 
It might now appear that we can freely assert gap-filling duties out of thin air. But there 
are two more issues. The first, addressed in this section, regards how we should 
conceptualise gap-filling duties in group agents as against non-agent groups. The second, 
addressed in §IV, is that we need some positive justification for asserting the duties. 
To explain the conceptualisation problem, consider again the slack-taking debate. 
Participants in that debate assume that groups like ‘polluters’ or ‘the affluent’ can have 
duties, whose constitutive parts can be (or have been) divided amongst all members of 
the group. Without such an assumption, the question of whether I must do more than my 
share of that duty, by taking up your slack, seems unable to arise. There is a problem 
with this assumption, which will shed new light on gap-filling duties.  
 The problem is that it is false that non-agent groups can properly be described as 
having duties, whose components have been or can be parcelled out, fairly or otherwise. 
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If a duty is a duty to perform some action (like ‘compensate crash victims’ families,’ or 
‘prevent catastrophic climate change’), and if only agents can perform actions (which 
looks plausible), then a non-agent group cannot have a duty to perform an action. Non-
agent groups—groups like polluters, but not groups like airlines—do not have the unified 
rational point of view and the distinct decision-making procedures characteristic of 
agency. So, they cannot act. This means they cannot have duties to act. Any duties 
ascribed to them, then, will be woefully poor normative guides.31  
 What does this mean for filling collective duty gaps? It means that if a duty gap 
arises in a non-agent group, then the question about whether we can fill the gap is simply 
the question of how demanding individual duties are or can be. With the ‘fair shares of 
the group duty’ baseline removed, the issue of ‘remedying harms that should be remedied 
by others, as their share of the group duty’ never arises. Instead, in non-agent groups, if 
some action is within your personal demandingness threshold, then, if it would be 
valuable enough, you ought to perform the action. This is the most defenders of gap-
filling (and, indeed, slack-taking) can defend. 
 By contrast, within group agents, it does make sense to talk about shares of the 
group duty, and about filling gaps that arise from others not doing their share. Even if no 
one created the duty gap, it makes sense to talk about a member’s share of the group’s 
reparative burden: that share will be determined largely by the member’s role within the 
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group.32 All group agents have roles. These roles can be understood as guiding members’ 
shares, about which we can sensibly ask the gap-filling question in terms of ‘doing more 
than your share of remedying the group’s harm’ or ‘taking up the slack.’ Of course, the 
group might not have distributed these roles fairly.33 But in that case, it still makes sense 
(in fact, is more urgent) to ask about whether individuals should take on others’ shares.  
 To summarise, to the extent we can fill collective duty gaps, we should use 
different conceptual tools to do so in group agents as compared with non-agent groups: in 
group agents, we should use the concept of slack-taking duties (since roles delineate the 
shares in that context), while, in non-agent groups, we should use the concept of 
individual reparative duties (since roles and shares do not apply). There are, then, two 
species of the genus ‘gap filling duties’: reparative slack-taking duties and reparative 
duties simpliciter.  
 This matters because it implies that any positive justification for slack-taking 
duties will likely not extend to gap-filling more generally. So, we need once more to step 
back from the slack-taking debate, and discuss gap-filling more generally. The aim is to 
find a justification for gap-filling duties, of both the slack-taking and straightforwardly 
reparative varieties. In §II, I replied to two objections to imposing costs on group 
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members in the pursuit of filling collective duty gaps. But I have not yet given a positive 
case for doing so. 
IV. Commitments to Ends as a Justification for Gap-filling Duties 
In short, my proposal is this: 
 
If:  
(i) two or more individuals have exchanged commitments to one another to positively 
respond to a permissible end, and  
(ii) harm arises from any (including aggregations) of those individuals’ reasonable 
positive responses to that end (including the responses of realising, pursuing, endorsing, 
maintaining), and  
(iii) individual duties to remedy the harm cannot be justified on the basis of individual 
harms or wrongs,  
then:  
(iv) each of the individuals has a duty (owed in part to those with whom she exchanged 
commitments) to take on costs in remedying the harm. 
 
There is a separate question about how to conceptualise these duties—as slack-taking 
duties, or as individual duties simpliciter. The duty in (iv) can be construed as slack-
taking in all cases—that is, in both agent and non-agent groups—if one remains 
unconvinced by §III. 
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The key concept here is commitment to another to (positively respond to34) a 
permissible end. This is a three-place relation: an agent, A, commits to another agent, B, 
to an end, E. Commitments to another to an end are ‘exchanged’ when A commits to B to 
E and B commits to A to E. This does not mean that A and B have committed to respond 
positively to the end together, or with we-intentions,35 or as a plural subject,36 or as a 
joint action,37 or with participatory intentions38—though they might have. It also does not 
mean that either A or B cause the other to respond positively to the end. Each agent’s 
committing need not even cause the end itself.  
So much for what committing is not. What is it? If A commits to B to E, then 
(constitutively) A has assured B that, or pledged to B that, or promised to B that, or 
invited B to rely on or trust in the fact that, she is disposed to respond positively to the 
end. This is neutral on the relation between such notions as promising, relying, assuring, 
raising expectations, and trust.39 Such debates notwithstanding, the crucial point is that, in 
committing, A gives B standing to hold A to account if A does not respond positively to 
E under certain conditions (again, the conditions for triggering the disposition will vary 
depending on A, B, E, and their context). 
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 What it means to ‘respond positively’ will vary depending on the end: some ends 
are to be realised, others pursued, others endorsed, others (for example, impossible ends) 
merely desired, and so on. For some ends, any such response is appropriate and the nature 
of the positive response may be a matter of discretion. By committing, the agent may 
‘sign up’ to one or more of these responses (perhaps without determining which).  When 
A and B have exchanged commitments to one another to E, then they are each permitted 
to rely on, or trust that, or consider themselves assured (as appropriate) that each is 
disposed to respond positively to E.  
I use the notion of ‘commitment’ rather than ‘promise’ to keep open the range of 
ways in which one might commit to another to an end. The exchanged commitment need 
not be as explicit as promises typically are. Depending on context, a commitment might 
arise with a mere glance or might arise gradually over time.40 It might arise by cheering 
on, or expressing solidarity with, a cause. In some contexts, we can commitment simply 
by doing precisely the things that committing commits us to do in the future. 
To motivate this proposal, take a small-scale example. Suppose I commit to you 
to cutting carbon emissions, and you commit to me to cutting carbon emissions. I say to 
you, firmly, “I’m going to aim at cutting emissions this year. That’s a commitment.” You 
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say the same to me. We have now exchanged commitments. Given our exchanged 
commitments, I may rely on you to pursue emissions reduction as and when you become 
able (since, let us assume, pursuit is the appropriate positive response to this end). I may 
hold you to account if you fail to do so. You are in a state of accountability to me. You 
are in my pocket and I am in yours. We are on the hook to each other. 
An attractive flipside of this mutual vulnerability-to-reproach is mutual claim-to-
support. If you take up cycling as a way of reducing emissions, but then get a tyre 
puncture, then I should help you repair it insofar as I can. If I must decide how to limit 
my attendance at overseas conferences, in order to fly less, then you should offer to help 
me decide which conferences for forgo. If you find vegetarianism horrible, then I should 
listen sympathetically and make suggestions where I can. The prospect of such support is 
one reason why we exchange commitments to others to ends in the first place. If I don’t 
offer such support, then you can question whether my commitment to emissions 
reduction was genuine in the first place (and you can beret me for it not being).  
My suggestion is that filling collective duty gaps is simply another type of such 
support: if you cause harm while (reasonably) responding positively the end, then I am 
(pro tanto) on the hook. The word ‘reasonably’ (and ‘reasonable’ in clause (ii) above) is 
important: I have a duty to fill in this gap only if your positive response to the end was 
reasonable. I assume that one is not being reasonable in one’s response to an end if one 
does not do one’s general epistemic duties, does not try to reason rationally from 
premises to conclusions, and so on. For example, if you recklessly run over a child while 
cycling to work as part of your pursuit of reduced emissions, then your pursuit of that the 
emissions-reduction end was not reasonable. In that circumstance, I would not acquire a 
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duty to fill the gap. Additionally, the reciprocity of the commitment—the fact that it has 
been made in both directions, from me to you and from you to me—is crucial. It means 
that we can see this as a form of insurance or cost-pooling, which one opts into when one 
engages in an exchange of commitments. 
Ontologically, we can view the exchange of commitments as creating an end-
oriented group (though this is probably not the only way of creating such a group). 
Members of an end-oriented group each hold a certain end, and are each disposed to rely 
upon and reinforce each other’s positive responses to that end. Again, end-oriented 
groups are not necessarily group agents or plural subjects, where the former have clear 
decision-making procedures and where the latter commit to do things as a body. 
Members of end-oriented groups need not even have meshing sub-plans41 or intend that 
the members together achieve the end,42 or have common knowledge that the end is held 
by each.43 
Nonetheless, when a group is end-oriented, outcomes are often possible that 
would not be possible if the group were not end-oriented. This is because members of 
end-oriented groups can (more reliably than non-end-oriented groups) predict, rely upon, 
and reinforce one another’s end-related actions and attitudes. This allows them to better 
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solve coordination problems, particularly if the problem relates to the end. Also, 
members can (more rationally than in non-end-oriented groups) ‘we-reason’ when 
choosing their own individual actions that relate to the end. When someone we-reasons, 
he “considers which combination of actions by members of the team would best promote 
the team’s objective, and then performs his part of that combination.”44 End-oriented 
groups thus hold a weak type of proto- shared agency, deriving from their common aim, 
common dispositions to predict, rely upon, and reinforce each other’s actions, and 
common rational availability of we-reasoning decision-making processes. The 
combination of weak proto- shared agency, mutual vulnerability-to-reproach, and mutual 
claim-to-support (including gap-filling remedial duties), provides a normative 
architecture for (at least partly) redressing moral collective action problems. 
To further illustrate, consider again Miller’s briefly described example: Bert steals 
Anne’s money then runs away. Charles is around. How can we move from Charles’ lack 
of fault to a duty for him to compensate Anne? Miller asserts that it is unfair to say 
Charles is required to compensate Anne. We are here intended to assume, I surmise, that 
Bert and Charles are unassociated.  
Let us alter the case. Imagine Bert and Charles have each committed to the other 
to the end of putting on free concerts in the town square.45 Bert performs in the square. 
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As Bert wheels his piano out of the square, taking reasonable care, he accidentally drops 
his piano, breaking Anne’s foot. Bert has no money to pay Anne’s hospital bills. Anne 
ought not to foot her bill, but upon whom can we place the duty?  
My suggestion is this: Charles has a duty, owed in part to Bert, to help pay Anne’s 
bill. At the very least, Charles has more of a duty here than some unconnected fourth 
party. Charles’ duty to compensate Anne arises out of his and Bert’s exchanged 
commitments to the end, which generates a duty to support one another in the reasonable 
pursuit of that end. If Bert and Charles form a group agent (which is neither entailed, nor 
ruled out, by their having exchanged commitments), and if remedying Bert’s harms is not 
part of Charles’s group-defined role but is part of Bert’s group-defined role (which Bert 
is currently unable to fulfil), then we can conceive of Charles’ duty as a duty to ‘take up 
the slack’ for Bert. If they do not form a group agent, then slack-taking does not apply, 
and the duty is simply one Charles incurs as an individual moral agent (as opposed to as a 
role bearer within a group agent). Whether or not Bert and Charles are a group agent, 
Charles’s duty fills the gap created by Bert’s clumsiness. 
This explanation of why there is no gap-filling duty in Miller’s original theft case 
is superior to Zofia Stemplowska’s explanation of it. Stemplowska suggests that Charles 
would have the duty when, only when, and because Anne is in grave need.46 Perhaps 
grave need is sufficient for a duty. But it is not necessary. Collective duty gaps will also 
trouble us in cases where the victims are not in grave need, such as that of the piano. 
Finally, notice that this account does not rely on the idea that the commitment exchangers 
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have done anything wrong, either together or jointly. It thus avoids the pitfalls of the two 
approaches considered in §I. 
V. The Range of the Account 
There are limits. One relates to the way in which ends are specified. Consider Erebus: a 
large company like an airline has numerous ends, many of which conflict, and many of 
which it has exchanged commitments to with only some of its staff. For example, it has 
the ends of maximising profits and of keeping passengers safe. Someone who cleans the 
plane cabins might have committed to neither of these ends. A safety engineer might 
have committed to only the safety end, and be vehemently opposed to the profit end 
(except as it is necessarily to maintain the safety end). An executive board member might 
treat safety as purely instrumental to the end of maximising profits. In the case of the 
Erebus crash, are all these individuals liable to gap-filling duties?  
 Not necessarily. Exactly what it takes to exchange commitments is a highly 
context-dependent and contestable matter. Roughly, we should judge whether 
commitments have been exchanged by asking whether (i) a culturally-informed 
reasonable person, or an ideal observer, or an idealised intersubjective deliberation 
process, would reach the conclusion that commitment-exchange has occurred; and (ii) if 
the agents were to honestly and coldly reflect (assuming this were possible), they would 
acknowledge the end as one to which they have exchanged commitments. Using this 
guideline, we do not necessarily distribute costs to plane cleaners when remedying the 
Erebus crash; to anti-war protesters when remedying the harms caused by the US-led 
invasion of Iraq; or to BP’s social responsibility officer when remedying the harms 
  
30 
 
caused by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.47 The exchanged commitments approach 
preserves the value of giving individuals some control over the duties they incur, while 
still filling the gaps.   
What about the pollution example? Different people have exchanged 
commitments to different things, but some of our contemporaries are on the hook. The 
relevant end, for many people, is something like ‘keeping this company in profit over the 
next few years.’ Many people have committed to their employers to this end, through 
their everyday work practices.48 Many employers have committed to that end in 
exchange, by making explicit its business goals. Pollution is an effect of the reasonable 
pursuit of such ends. So, those who have exchanged such commitments have duties to fill 
the collective duty gaps (that is, duties to alleviate harm to Earth-inheriting children) that 
arise from their company’s pursuit of that end. The individuals can have duties to fill this 
gap even if their individual actions in the pursuit of that end are not harmful, because 
they and their commitment-exchangers do harm in aggregate. 
 
6. Conclusion 
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In sum, we can—often, though not always—fill collective duty gaps by acknowledging 
the existence of commitment-based duties. I say ‘not always’ because there will remain 
cases where there are no exchanged commitments, and yet there is a collective duty gap. 
The question remains of how to fill these. Other questions remain too, such as how the 
costs of filling collective duty gaps should be apportioned amongst the gap-fillers. 
Exchanged commitments are an important and overlooked tool in our gap-filling 
armoury, but they are not the only tool we will ever need.  
